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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The two foregoing decisions have for their bases the following quotation
from Cooper-Snell Co. v. State, 230 N. Y. 249: "One of the cardinal rules to be
applied in construing statutes is that they are to be read according to the
natural and obvious import of their language, without restoring to a subtle or
forced construction either limiting or extending their effect." This strict view
is not taken in all cases, although most definitions of "weapons" do not or-
dinarily include air guns.
By way of an interesting side-light on the problem of whether the air gun is
a firearm, we have the decision of Cada v. The Fair, 187 Ill. 111, where the
court held a toy air gun to be a toy firearm within the meaning of an ordinance
forbidding the sale to minors of "any gun, pistol, or other firearm, or any toy
gun, toy pistol, or other toy firearm in which any explosive substance can be
used." The court qualifies its opinion and declares this air gun to come under
the statute prohibiting firearms because it is a "toy" which is "a plaything for
children," and reasons, "such a toy gun" must be manifestly different from a
real gun, and the fact that children are to play with it takes it out of the hard
and fast definition of a firearm as used by a grown person. Furthermore, the
language of the statute qualifies this and brings us to a correct interpretation
because it is a "toy gun," and the statute specifically mentions "toy guns, toy
pistols, etc." However, the court goes further and qualifies its decision by ex-
plaining that compressed air is the cause of the explosion which propels the
projectile, and that consequently this brings it under the statute prohibiting
firearms in which any explosive substance may be used. This last qualification
is in conflict with previously mentioned decisions, and upon this ground, one
might quarrel with the Illinois case.
There does appear to be a certain relaxation on the part of the courts in
interpreting the words of the statute in regard to weapons. For example, it
was held in People v. Gogak, 171 N. W. 428 (1919), a Michigan case, that the
legislature intended, in certain acts, relating to the carrying of concealed
weapons, to go further than the specific weapons mentioned in the statute, and
to embrace any "other offensive and dangerous weapons or instruments con-
cealed upon his person." Here the court declared a knife to be a dangerous
weapon.
This illustrates one tendency of the courts which seems to be based on the
idea that legislative acts should be interpreted according to what the court
considers their true meaning. The other tendency is to a strict interpreta-
tion, as illustrated by the New York case. C. H. W., '28.
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS AND PRIVILEGED CoM-
MuNICATIONs.-Defendant objected to the introduction of testimony on the
part of a nurse relating to information obtained while she was so employed as
nurse under the attending physician on the ground that such information was
privileged. Held, that the objection included all the testimony of the witness
and was too broad. Objection should have been made to each question calling
for privileged information. The court, however, intimates that communications
to the nurse as an assistant of the physician and as necessary to enable the
physician to prescribe would be privileged. Meyer et al. v. Russell, 214 N. W.
857, (N. D. 1927).
At common law there is no privilege as between physician and patient, and
this rule is still law where it has not been changed by statute, Green v. St. Louis
Terminal Railroad Association, 211 Mo. 18, 109 S. W. 715. At the present time,
however, the matter is generally controlled by statutes establishing as privileged
communications between physician and patient necessary for professional care,
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and in a few states (New York and Arkansas) as between nurse and patient,
Homnyack v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 194 N. Y. 456, 87
N. E. 769. In the reported opinion, the court cites a Nebraska case, Culver v.
Union Pacific Railway Company, 112 Nebr. 441, 199 N. W. 794, decided under
a statute similar to that of North Dakota, which held that a nurse merely as
such was not within the statute, but that a different rule prevails where the
nurse acts as one of the agents or assistants of the physician in charge. The
reason for the rule, of course, is to encourage complete understanding and con-
fidence between physician and patient. Jurisdictions in which the common law
still prevails might well express themselves in the words of Owen, J., in a dis-
senting opinion in the case of Maine v. Maryland Casualty Company, 172 Wis.
350, 178 N. W. 749. "The centuries of experience during which the common
law was developed did not give rise to this rule . . . Well may this statute
receive legislative reconsideration, and if it is still thought desirable to afford
protection to those who have but scant claim upon the consideration of so-
ciety, then let it be so framed that such protection can be extended without
working hardship and injustice upon the innocent and pure."
In a concurring opinion written in the case of Epstein v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road Company, 250 Mo. I, Lamm, C. J. quotes with favor the following ex-
cerpt from Green v. St. Louis Terminal Railroad Association, supra: "The
statute creates a privilege unknown to the common law . . . Though in
derogation of the common law, courts have not applied the rule of strict con-
struction sometimes applied to statutes of that character. To the contrary the
right doctrine seems to be that the policy of the statute is an elevated one. It
was intended to invite confidence between physician and patient aid to prevent
a breach of such confidence, and should be so construed as to further its life
and purpose. It is obvious, the language of the statute is of such sort that its
interpretation and application are troublesome . . . On the one hand, it
might be so construed as to fritter away the provisions of the law. On the
other hand, it might be so literally construed as to work great mischief in the
administration of justice . . . The application of such law must be with
discrimination so that it may have the legislative effect intended for it and
yet the investigation of truth be not unnecessarily thwarted."
The principal case reflects a tendency in the law to extend the protection of
the "privileged communication" rule, in accord with the above opinions, to in-
clude communications to a nurse under communications to a physician, where
such communications are necessary in order to prescribe treatment.
E. K., '29.
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